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THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS

KERMIT L. HALL
tory lists, during the past twenty years, only six
articles dealing with the subject and no books.
These numbers stand in sharp contrast to the
more than sixty entries and two major books
on southern legal history and the more than
twenty articles devoted to the legal culture of
the Rocky Mountain and Pacific states. 3 Our
ignorance about the legal culture of the Great
Plains is even more sobering when we realize
that in the past century scholars of American
constitutional and legal history have produced
more than twenty thousand books and articles,
with more than four thousand of those published in the 1980s. While the Great Plains
economies have regularly gone through cycles
of boom and bust, scholarship about the region's
legal culture has never even taken off. Indeed,
there is not even an agenda for such scholarship.
So an important threshold question is why
this neglect? In part, it is an accident of location. The major centers of learning about legal
history have not been in the plains states; there
has been no Willard Hurst or Lawrence Friedman to make the region a historical laboratory
for testing various hypotheses about legal culture. Instead the nation's legal history has been

The great prairie lawyer Abraham Lincoln once
said of an opposing legal counsel's argument,
"He caught on to something, but only by the
hind leg."l Lincoln's observation applies with
equal force to our current understanding of the
legal culture of the Great Plains, and even that
characterization is generous. Take, for example,
the literature on the region's history of public
and private law and legal institutions. It is pitifully small. Bits and pieces are scattered through
specialized journals and state history periodicals, but there is nothing like a systematic body
of scholarship. 2
The major bibliographic guide to the literature in American constitutional and legal his-
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drawn, at least until quite recently, from the
East and from New England, especially. If Willard Hurst, perhaps the greatest American legal
historian, had lived in Nebraska instead of Wisconsin, chances are good that we would know
more today about its legal culture than we do.
Even native Nebraskan Roscoe Pound, who had
strong historical interests, drew his examples
from England and New England rather than the
Plains. t
Second, while scholars have churned out an
impressive body of literature about the Great
Plains, they have seldom thought to analyze law
and legal institutions as reflections of the region's assumptions about society, culture, and
economy. When they have turned to the law,
historians of the Great Plains have usually taken
climate and geography as both the beginning
and the ending point of analysis, failing to probe
the ways in which modes of economic production and social organization on the Plains have
shaped and been shaped by the law. Historians
of the Great Plains have not approached law as
a social and cultural artifact; instead, they have
typically viewed it as a closed system chained
by environmental determinism. 5
There is a third reason for the slight attention paid to the region's legal history. For the
national community of jurists, the Great Plains
has been a legal backwater. Judges and treatise
writers in the nation's other regions have paid
slight attention to legal developments on the
Plains. Studies by Peter Harris, Lawrence Friedman, and Rodney Mott on the reputations of
state supreme courts over the past century and
a halfleave little doubt about this matter. 6 Peter
Harris measured citations by sixteen state supreme courts of cases from other state supreme
courts forthe period 1870-1970. The two Great
Plains states included in his study-Kansas and
South Dakota-have persistently lacked citation power. Indeed, the states of the Great Plains
ranked even lower than the often maligned state
courts of the South, including Alabama, North
Carolina, and Virginia. In Harris's study, nobody cited two state supreme courts as authority-Delaware and South Dakota. 7 Of course,
citation is not the same as influence, and there

is reason to believe, according to the studies of
Rodney Mott, that the high courts of Kansas
and Nebraska in the early twentieth century
achieved some distinction. But no appellate
court on the Great Plains has ever achieved the
reputation enjoyed by its counterparts in California, New York, and Massachusetts. 8
This status reflects the fact that the states
with the richest and most complex economic,
social, and cultural settings are also likely to
produce the richest legal environment. 9 But it
is also true that the Great Plains states have
been net importers of legal talent. A collective
survey of the 420 judges who served on the
highest courts of appeal in the ten states between 1870 and 1970 reveals as much. \0 Until
the mid-1930s a majority of plains state judges
received their legal educations outside the region, a condition that suggests that legal education there lagged behind developments
elsewhere. Only in the last fifty years have the
Great Plains states developed a high proportion
of judges trained within the region.
There is a fourth and final reason why legal
historians have showered so little attention on
the Great Plains. Lincoln, once again, captured
the spirit of things. In describing an especially
spirited wrestling match, he observed that the
opponents had struggled so fiercely that they
got inside one another's coats. More often than
not, legal historians have simply swallowed up
the Great Plains as part of the general legal
history of the West. 11
That the legal culture of the Great Plains
has been ignored does not mean, of course, that
it should be ignored or that it is unimportant.
We should also recognize that our lack of attention to law and legal institutions on the Great
Plains only abets the skewed vision that we have
of American legal development as an emanation exclusively of New England. 12
Having said all of this, we arrive at the central question. Has the Great Plains had and does
it now have a distinctive legal culture? By legal
culture we mean the ideas, attitudes, values,
and opinions about law held by people in a
society. 13 The assumption is that these ideas and
attitudes influence legal behavior, especially the
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kind and level of demands placed on the legal
system. In raising the question of legal culture,
we are asking when and why and where people
have turned to law and government. The assumption is that if we understand legal culture
we can, in tum, better appreciate the role of
law in society.
We can grasp the implications of this relationship between social change and the law by
resorting to a somewhat stereotypical perspective. As one sage has observed:
In Germany, under the law, everything is
prohibited except that which is permitted.
In France, under the law, everything is
permitted, except that which is prohibited.
In the Soviet Union, under the law,
everything is prohibited, including that which
is permitted.
In Italy, under the law, everything is permitted, especially that which is prohibited.
And in the United States, under the law,
everything is both permitted and prohibited,
because Americans are forever deciding the
law but nothing ever seems to get decided. 14
We should remember, however, that particularity is not the same thing as legal culture.
The Great Plains, like all regions of the nation,
has certainly generated unique demands that
have, in tum, produced laws and legal institutions different from those of other areas of the
country. How different these changes really have
been, both as a matter of inter- and intraregional comparison, is something worth paying
attention to, but we should remember that
uniqueness and adaptation of older legal forms
to newer circumstances does not necessarily
herald a new legal culture. It is the attitudes,
values, ideas, and opinions behind those changes
that really count, and they can, of course, be
exactly the same even if they are expressed in
different ways. The other important point is
that legal culture is not static; it evolves over
time as the nature of social demands and expectations change. As Roscoe Pound once observed: "The law must be stable, but it must
not stand still. "15

REGIONALISM AND LAW

Our interest in the legal culture of the Great
Plains is further evidence of the renewed vigor
of regional history generally, especially in legal
history. 16 After more than forty years of neglect,
regional studies of all stripes are once again on
the rise, in part because they appear to offer
certain comparative advantages not found in
local, state, or national studies. Legal historians
have in fact shown increasing sympathy toward
regional studies over the past decade. David
Bodenhamer, Gordon Bakken, James W. Ely,
Jr., Paul Finkelman, John Reid, and David Langum, to name but a few, have argued that generalizations drawn from regional patterns of legal
organization and behavior are of greater comparative significance than generalizations drawn
from community or national studies alone. 17 Regional studies, they contend, have allowed
scholars to identify more precisely that which
is merely local and to control for its effects.
Similarly, proponents of regional studies insist
that their findings offer the best test of attitudes
and behavior that purport to be truly national.
In order to have a regional legal history,
however, one must first have a region. In the
case of the Great Plains, the matter of definition
is a good deal more complex than might first
appear. The simplest and most commonly used
definition is environmental. Its leading proponent was Walter Prescott Webb, who believed that physical geography and climate
unified the region. Webb's book, The Great
Plains, first published in 1931, remains today
the single most widely read history of the region. In it he approached the Great Plains as
an environment unified by its flatness, lack of
trees, and semiaridity. For our purposes, this
plains environment can be narrowed to what
constitutes the heart of the region-portions of
the ten states of Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, North and South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Webb
argued that once immigrants crossed the eastern
boundary of the Great Plains at the ninetyeighth meridian all of the institutions they had
known in the East were, in his words, "either
broken or remade or else greatly altered. "18
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This environment, Webb insisted, produced
not only a unique body of law but a legal culture
entirely distinct from that in the East. "The
Easterner, with his background of forest and
farm," Webb observed, "could not always understand the man of the cattle kingdom."
One went on foot, the other went on horseback; one carried his law in books, the other
carried it strapped round his waist. One represented tradition, the other represented innovation; one responded to convention, the
other responded to necessity and evolved his
own conventions. Yet the man of the timber
and the town made the law for the man of
the plain;' the plainsman, finding this law
unsuited to his needs, broke it and was called
lawless. 19
Webb also pointed to the democratic nature of
the Great Plains, giving special attention to the
development of women's suffrage. In short, according to Webb, the legal culture of the Great
Plains resonated to the values of innovation,
individualism, democracy, and lawlessness present in the region's general culture. The great
open skies of the Plains, it seems, provided almost boundless opportunities for individuals, so
much so that individuals often took the law into
their own hands.
Historians, geographers, and anthropologists
have subjected Webb's environmental determinism to often withering criticism, but it retains considerable vitality, as any reader of Ian
Frazier's similarly titled recent book on the region will appreciate. 2o Moreover, of all the historians who have written on the Great Plains,
Webb provides by far the most coherent, if ultimately clipped, assessment of the law and legal
institutions. Thus, both as a way of assessing
the region's legal culture and as a means of
dealing with the coherence of the Great Plains
as other than a geographic fact of life, Webb's
thesis of individualism, innovation, and violence seems an appropriate place for the infant
field of Great Plains legal history to begin.

TESTING WEBB'S THESIS

Much of Webb's argument about the inventiveness and individualism of the Great Plains
rested on his analysis of property law in three
important areas: land, livestock, and water. But
how well do his arguments hold up?
Take, for example, the open-range cattle industry in the Great Plains. The fact that fencing
materials were scarce in the treeless plain led
cattlemen to demand that the English commonlaw requirement to fence livestock be abrogated
and the burden of fencing be placed upon crop
farmers. Plains legislators passed open-range
statutes that placed the burden to fence on the
farmer. If damage to crops by livestock were
litigated, then the farmer had to prove he had
maintained a legal fence around his crops to
collect money damages from the cattle owner.
Yet there was considerable borrowing; fencingout statutes were hardly unique to the Plains.
Borrowing legal doctrine from the East was one
of the common features of the Great Plains,
and even in an area so seemingly unique as the
cattle industry, cultural memories about law were
often long. John Reid has made the same point
about migrants crossing the Great Plains in the
1850s. 21
What gave visibility to the fencing statutes
on the Great Plains was not their novelty but
the fact that they sought to resolve conflicts
among farmers, free-grass cattlemen, and barbedwire ranchers. Hence the legal culture of the
Great Plains resonated far more to the economic
pressures associated with a shift on the Plains
from the nineteenth-century economics of pastoral stock raising to the twentieth century practice of farming. In short, the law as it affected
cattle and fencing had more to do with competing modes of economic production than it
did with innovation as a paramount value. 22
There seems little doubt that the law of property rights in the West was highly instrumental
where issues of economic development were involved. Initially land on the Great Plains was
not a scarce resource although it eventually became so. For much of the 1860s and 1870s
"squatter sovereignty" was sufficient for settling
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land ownership questions. 23 The range was open
and there was little in the way of an exclusive
right to own and use it. Cattlemen did not own
the land; they exercised instead "range rights"
that neighbors recognized but that the law did
not enforce. To secure these accustomed rights,
ranchers ran claim advertisements in local
newspapers. By the 1880s, however, competing
agricultural groups on the Plains often had conflicting claims to the same land without any
enforceable mechanism to settle them. The result was a prolonged struggle among different
kinds of land users. Cattlemen, for example,
organized in an effort to persuade state and territoriallegislators to pass statutes that punished
those who drove their stock from the accustomed range, but by the 1880s stock growers
associations had persuaded several state legislatures to enact statutes that restricted entry
onto the range through control of access to the
limited water supplies. The entire movement
in land law in the Great Plains at the end of
the nineteenth century was from communal to
exclusive ownership, a development that had
long been under way in the East and that has
continued unabated even today as more and
more of Great Plains land and productive capacity has been placed in fewer and fewer
hands.24 While often advertised as protecting
individual property rights, these developments
have actually produced a consolidation of landholding that mocks the notion of the small,
self-reliant farmer. Once again, the generally
inefficient small livestock and farming enterprises yielded before large, well capitalized agricultural businesses.
Much the same has happened with water law,
an area to which Webb pointed to underscore
the inventiveness of Great Plains legal culture.
As with land and livestock, however, water regulation on the Plains seems less innovative and
distinctive than Webb imagined. 25 From the
outset, access to and control of water was the
most crucial economic consideration on the
Plains. Initially western settlers adopted the riparian system of water rights, which meant that
the right to use water accrued to the one who
owned the bank of the stream. That such ri-

parian water rights, whether implicit or explicit, were adopted by the frontiersman is not
difficult to understand. Indeed, it was not until
settlement was well under way, as Donald J.
Pisani has shown, that water law began to change
significantly, granting to the first appropriator
of it an exclusive right and to later appropriators
rights conditioned upon the prior rights of those
who had gone before them. 26 The new rules
also permitted the diversion of waters to nonriparian lands, the extinguishment of rights in
water if not used, and the transfer of water rights
from one person to another.
As with land and livestock, the pattern in
the development of water law on the Great
Plains was from common to exclusive rights.
Yet even in this seemingly most unique area,
the states of the Great Plains were borrowers,
as Robert G. Dunbar has shown. The states did
not build their own system of water law de novo;
instead they borrowed lavishly from the California legislature and supreme court, whose decisions in Irwin v. PhiUips, Lux v. Haggin, and
Katz v. Walkinshaw became models adopted in
the plains states. 27 Colorado, for example, which
led the states of the Great Plains in dealing with
the issues of multiple uses of water, drew heavily
from the California experience to fashion what
became known as the Colorado Doctrine---a
doctrine that protected vested users in their
rights to water. 28
Moreover, there were significant differences
within the Great Plains. Much like Lincoln's
wrestlers, Webb often let the status of water law
in the Great Plains get swallowed up in his
description of the West as a whole. The trend
toward exclusivity was strongest in those states--Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexic(}-where rainfall averaged less than fifteen
inches a year, while in states with somewhat
greater amounts of rainfall-North and South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas--the common law was retained in a modified form, one that followed the lead of California in recognizing both riparian and
appropriative rights. Furthermore, the long term
pattern has not been to serve the individual
small water user but to reward the heavily cap-
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italized businesses that make modem agribusiness work.
There is no doubt that innovation was an
important feature of the Great Plains legal culture, but it was neither unique nor determinative. Property rights were sometimes treated
in different ways than they were in the East,
but that did not mean that easterners, in other
areas of economic development, such as the
fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence, were incapable of innovating on their own. The reasonable use
doctrine, which became an important part of
water law on the Great Plains, was also applied
to stream courses and water power in the East
as a way of expediting the development of manufacturing. 29 In the end, felt economic needs,
not geography and climate, were the real inducements to legal innovation-in the Great
Plains or elsewhere.

LAWLESSNESS AND VIOLENCE

Interregional differences in legal culture and
the habit of borrowing were evident in two other
areas: lawlessness and violence and the legaV
political status of women. The Great Plains,
according to commentators as different in outlook as Webb and Patricia Nelson Limerick, was
a rough and tumble place, in which violence
and extralegal behavior figured prominently in
the underlying culture. Truman Capote, of
course, crystallized the notion of the violent
Plains in his book In Cold Blood. Capote captured the essence of what frightens us most about
violence on the Plains--it was random, remorseless, methodical, and suffered in a remote
Kansas farm house. There were, of course, other
kinds of violence on the Plains; some of it, like
that associated with Bat Masterson and Wyatt
Earp, involved conflict resolution, while other
violence, such as that associated with ecotage
and the Earth First! movement, was directed at
authority itself. 30
Let us, however, concentrate only on one
kind of crime--homicide. One of the reasons
that Capote's book so shocks our conscience is
that it is the exception and not the rule. Every

recent study of violence and crime finds the
Great Plains states lagging far behind the national leader-the South. The white male
homicide rates from the late nineteenth century
up to today reveal that no Great Plains state,
including that seeming bastion of violence-Texas---, ranks in the top twenty, with most of
the states of the Plains scattered over the middle
or lower end of the spectrum. 31 In more recent
times, Texas and New Mexico have shown a
higher rate of homicide, but even they lag behind Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia,
South Carolina, and Florida. The other Great
Plains states rank very low. 32
These figures also caution us against thinking
about the Great Plains in an exclusively NorthSouth fashion. Cultural interpreters of the
Plains, such as Earl Pomeroy and Robert Berkhofer, have argued that in many instances such
an alignment does not make sense. 33 Homicide
rates suggest as much. The culture of North
Dakota, for example, more closely resembles
that of Minnesota than that of Nebraska and
Kansas. The southern Plains, on the other hand,
have much more in common with Arkansas and
Tennessee than with the northern Plains. According to many geographers, folklorists, and
linguists, it is the East-West patterns of settlement and interregional migration flows rather
than environmental attributes that define the
Plains.J.4
In the case of homicide and suicide that was
certainly true. Where the influx of southern
immigrants was greatest-Texas, New Mexico,
and Oklahoma-the incidence of violence was
the highest. Where the flow of population included more Scandinavian and Yankee stock,
as was true in the northern tier of the Great
Plains states, homicide has been less frequent.
In short, as Raymond D. Gastil's study of cultural regionalism reveals, the presence of southerners on the Great Plains has historically been
the best predictor of violence. At the same time,
the incidence of suicide has been highest in the
northern Plains, with its strong Scandinavian
origins. 35 Any characterization of the Great
Plains as violent always has to be framed comparatively, since there are fairly significant inter- and intraregional variations.
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LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS
OF WOMEN

The same can be said of the legal and political status of women. We are only beginning
to have some idea of the historical development
of family law on the Plains. There is a working
hypothesis that marital matters in farming communities tend to be conservative, with little
room for women to escape. Yet if we look beneath this relationship, as Paula Petrik is doing
in her on-going study of divorce law in the
West, we find a mixture of morality and economic expediency. Here as elsewhere, Great
Plains lawmakers seemed sensitive to economic
necessity, crafting the law in instrumental ways
so as to protect the integrity and earning power
of the family. Take, for example, the case of
Nebraska. Its divorce law included grounds of
desertion, adultery, extreme cruelty, intemperance, and an omnibus provision of other but
less utilized causes, including impotency, conviction for a felony, and the like. In this regard
Nebraska divorce law mimicked developments
elsewhere in the country. But in those plains
states with large numbers of homesteaders, Petrik has also discovered that a "dower" clause
was attached to most divorce statutes. It entitled a wronged wife to her dower right (onethird of the property) should her spouse be
blamed for the dissolution of the marriage. 36
The dower clause, in short, complicated divorce
in late nineteenth-century Nebraska and demonstrated the influence of homestead-based land
ownership on divorce in the upper Great Plains.
The dower clause probably helped to account
for the higher number of settlement and alimony cases that came to the highest appellate
courts of the northern Plains, which were faced
with the task of constantly refining the boundaries of spousal support.
The dower clause also apparently influenced
husbands. We know, for example, that more
men than women filed for divorce in Nebraska,
employing a preemptive strike strategy to shift
blame to their wives and protect their farms
from execution. There is also evidence, according to Petrik, that the highest appellate

courts of the northern tier of the Great Plains
states were increasingly pressed to give clearer
and clearer definitions of extreme cruelty and
desertion-normally "women's" charges in a divorce proceeding. The Montana Supreme Olurt
in Albert tI. Albert in 1885 defined extreme cruelty as a single incident of physical abuse and
set the stage for the lower courts' use of mental
cruelty. The Wyoming legislature in 1899, however, threw in the towel and simply provided
that divorces could be granted as a result of any
"indignities" that rendered the marriage "intolerable. "37 For a short period in the 1870s and
1880s the lenient divorce and residency laws in
North and South Dakota made them havens for
migratory divorces. The pattern, however, was
much different in the southern Plains, where
Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico made divorce harder. 38
There were also differences in the legal provisions governing property rights of married
women. While Texas and New Mexico adopted
the civil law system of community property, the
other Great Plains states embraced the common
law system. Several of these states also wrote
some degree of protection for married women's
property rights into their constitutions, with
Texas in 1845 and Kansas in 1859 leading the
way. The expansion of land ownership by women
gave these acts special significance, with Wyoming giving married women separate control
over their earnings during marriage and equal
custody of their children. 39
Wyoming, of course, also led the way in
granting women suffrage. In 1869 the territory
granted women the right to vote, which also
gave them access to the jury box and service in
other positions formerly reserved for men. Esther Morris, a Wyoming suffragist, served as the
first female justice of the peace in the United
States. Yet by 1900 only one other Great Plains
state-Colorado-had followed Wyoming's
lead. By 1914 Montana and Kansas had extended the franchise, but the other states in the
region did not follow until shortly before passage
of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.10
These developments underscore the problems of thinking of the Great Plains as a legal
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unity. It is clear, of course, that a change in
women's status was far more welcome there than
in the East, but the motives were mixed at best.
Where married women's property rights were
involved, the pattern seems to have been more
uniform, since giving women access to the eco,
nomic mainstream was beneficial to economic
growth. Why this was so in the Plains rather
than the East is a question that, if answered,
would tell us as much about developments there
as on the Great Plains.
In the case of suffrage the motives behind
the legal and constitutional reforms were more
varied. In the East, entrenched political struc'
tures prevented broader social change; in lonely
Wyoming there were no established political
machines and accordingly there was no estab,
lished opposition to the idea of women's suf,
frage. 41 In Colomdo there is some evidence-though far from conclusive--that its mdicalla,
bor movement and strong populist roots led to
acceptance of the related movement for female
equality.42 In Kansas, women's rights were tied
to women's religiosity and the hope that the
women's vote would promote temperance and
other moml causes. There were, once again,
important intraregional and as well as interre,
gional variations. 43
EcoNOMICS AND LAW

For all of its seeming democmtic and indi,
vidualistic tendencies, the legal culture of the
Great Plains reflects back to us strong tenden,
des toward regulation of that most important
of all areas of human endeavors--the creation
of wealth. While seemingly professing the cow'
boy ideal of "don't fence me in," Great Plains
lawmakers were more than willing to regulate
and redistribute wealth.
While geogmphy and climate may well have
shaped the agriculture pmcticed on the Plains,
it was distant eastern and world markets that
most influenced the wealth that residents of the
Plains could generate from crops and livestock.
Even so adamant an environmentalist as the
sociologist Carl Kmenzel concluded that the
Great Plains had been exploited by eastern

manufacturers and milroads in such a way as to
tum it into a kind of third,world economy that
depended on agricultuml exports in order to
attain eastern credit and technology.44 These
developments, Kmenzel and others argue, ac,
celerated in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century and gave birth to first the Granger and
then the Populist political movements.
With the exception of a brief boom during
the 1880s, the prices of agricultuml commodi,
ties grown on the Plains plunged, with wheat,
for example, falling by more than half its value,
to $63 a bushel in 1897. Great Plains farmers
attributed this collapse to the monopolistic
practices of gmin elevator and railroad opem,
tors, who in tum charged that the farmers had
brought it on themselves by overproduction.
Whatever the truth of the matter, the plains
farmers concluded that they were badly abused,
cheated by elevator owners, robbed by railroad
barons, and overcharged by eastern manufac,
turers. 45 Thus political action became the means
to redress these woes, first in individual states,
which passed antitrust and regulatory legislation
involving railroads and elevators, and later in
the movement for similar legislation in Wash,
ington. The Granger movement of the 1870s
was especially strong in Kansas and Nebraska
where small town merchants and businessmen,
who also suffered from predatory pricing poli,
des, joined with farmers. Yet even on these
important issues of economic regulation and re,
distribution, the states of the Great Plains were
not pioneers. The four upper Mississippi Valley
states-Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minne,
sota-were models of regulation, in large mea'
sure because the Republican and Democmtic
parties were evenly balanced there and hence
vulnerable to political pressure from the
Grange. 46
Eventually, however, the political activism
of these older states spilled over into the Plains.
In the 1880s the boom in demand for plains
foodstuffs brought an enormous infusion of spec'
ulative capital. Land values skyrocketed; spec'
ulation was rampant; every tiny hamlet began
to think itself a metropolis. Fifteen Kansas towns
installed streetcar systems during the boom, all
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paid for by speculative eastern capital. Farmers
committed the fatal sin of overmortgaging their
property, and when the weather turned dry at
the end of the 1880s the farm economies of the
Plains collapsed. 47
The depression of the late 1880s was so
sweeping in its destruction that it forced many
plains farmers, at least those who stayed, to
rethink their relationship to the political and
legal system. Between 1888 and 1892 half the
population of western Kansas moved out, most
of it back to the East. The farmers that remained
were not only overmortgaged but they quickly
fell into a vicious cycle of going deeper into
debt each year in order to sell more goods at
lower prices. This sweeping economic disaster
brought new attention to the rights of debtors
and the powers of creditors to seize and hold
property in default, issues that deserve far closer
attention among legal historians than they have
received. This cumulative economic frustration
eventually ignited the Populist Revolt.
THE POPULIST REVOLT

Populism on the Plains was not so much a
political movement, although it was certainly
that, as it was a quasi-religious revival, in which
the farmers rallied to seek through law solutions
to the crushing debt and the burdensome taxes
that they faced. The agrarian revolt in 1890
produced startling legal results on the Plains.
The Populist revolt also ushered in the most
important period of legal innovation on the
Plains, and these developments came at a time
when the Plains had, in tum, the greatest impact on national law. While the Populist revolt
spread far beyond the boundaries of the Great
Plains, its farmers nonetheless symbolized its
strength. At the 1892 convention of the People's Party in Omaha, Nebraska, the delegates
agreed on what became for the next third of a
century the major elements of reform politics
in America: the creation of a flexible currency;
honesty, economy, and greater openness in government; a graduated income tax; postal savings
banks; government ownership of railroads and
telegraph lines; abolition of alien land holdings;

and reclamation of all lands held by railroads
and other corporations in excess of their needs.
The Populists insisted in the preamble to their
1892 Omaha Platform that "wealth belongs to
him who creates it. "48
The Populist program looks mild by today's
standards, but it was thoroughly radical in its
own day. The legal and economic readjustments
called for by the Populists had class conflict
overtones, so much so that employers retaliated
against many members by threatening them with
wage cuts and layoffs if they voted for William
Jennings Bryan in 1896. Bryan, of course, lost
to the Republican William McKinley, although
Bryan did carry all the Great Plains states except
North Dakota.
In defeat the Populists were ultimately vindicated. They succeeded in securing from plains
state legislatures debt relief legislation that became a model for agricultural states outside the
region. They wanted progressive constitutional
and governmental reforms: the conservative
Theodore Roosevelt gave them railroad regulation, the reactionary William Howard Taft
postal savings banks, and the liberal Woodrow
Wilson a more flexible currency through the
Federal Reserve System. The initiative and referendum the Populists desired, and the recall
they considered too radical to ask for, were in
general used not only in the Plains but throughout the nation by 1912. The seventeenth
amendment, allowing a federal income tax, came
shortly afterward.
THE FEDERAL IMPACT'

These developments also help place the Plains
within American federalism. The Populist Revolt sought through the power of the federal
government to restore a semblance of balance
between producers and consumers, one in which
the exporting states of the Plains would have
an opportunity to compete effectively in the
national marketplace. Hence in the twentieth
century the Great Plains states have been the
beneficiaries of enormous government largess.
In 1974 Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado
echoed sentiments a century old when he en-
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dorsed an OPEC-like organization of energyrich western states against proposed federal controls. "We're saying," Lamm asserted, "that there
are certain things that happen to colonies-whether they are in Colorado or the Congo--if there is not some assertiveness on the part of
their leaders. And we are not going to be colonized."49
Beneath such rhetoric lurks a profound reality: On a per capita basis, no other region of
the country in this century has been better supported by the federal government than the Great
Plains, through massive agricultural subsidies,
land and water reclamation projects, military
bases, and most recently a futile effort to develop coal gasification and synthetic fuels projects. Between 1850 and 1950, the federal
government poured more than $150 billion into
the region, and it has long since been the largest
single employer in two of the plains states: North
Dakota and New Mexico. 50 The distribution of
this federal largess was neither simple nor automatic, depending as it has on a complicated
network of federal, state, and local administrative agencies staffed by thousands of bureaucrats. The relationship between the federal
administrative process and administrative law,
on the one hand, and the economic development of the Great Plains, on the other, is certainly one of the least understood aspects of the
region's legal culture. Many of the plains states
have resisted this federal involvement at the
same time that they have benefited from it.
Indeed, many residents of the Great Plains seem
to love to hate the federal dollars that they love
to receive.
CoNCLUSION

While the general drift in twentieth-century
legal culture has been to secure individual rights
through government-sponsored social welfare
and economic opportunity programs, most of
the region's states, especially in the upper Plains,
have resisted. Moreover, for a region that prides
itself on individualism and autonomy, its lawmakers have, like those in other sections of the
nation, displayed a nasty tendency to strike out

against those that it fears. Thus, as Paul Pinkelman explains in his study of Meyer v. Nebraska, powerful nativist tendencies have
frequently shaped the culture of rights on the
Plains. 51 Surely legal historians can do much to
understand the interplay of economic imperative and racial and ethnic prejudice on the
Plains. Much work remains to be done, as well,
on what rights meant on the Great Plains in
the context of white and Native American relations, although we have made a beginning of
sorts. 52
At least on first impression, those qualities
that seem to set the Great Plains apart-individualism, innovation, democracy, and lawlessness--appear on closer inspection to be more
dimly reflected in the region's legal culture than
Webb and other environmentalists believed. It
may well be, as Patricia Nelson Limerick has
argued, that as often as not these frontier qualities dissolved into surface-skimming waste,
brash overconfidence, and reckless speculation. 53 She may well be right: the inhabitants
of the Great Plains have been too absorbed in
their own pursuit of wealth to pay much attention to the needs of society. The plains states
have been, throughout their history, strongholds of political conservatism, despite outraged
cries of easterners about plains radicalism. The
periodic protests raised on the Plains have usually been leveled against change, with the region's residents preferring the maintenance of
an agrarian social order against an increasingly
industrialized and interdependent world economy. Ironically this seems to have been the
motivation of farmers who in the 1930s shifted
the center of conservative Republicanism to the
upper Plains in their vain effort to check a "New
Deal" that held forth the best promise for farm
supports, relief to the victims of the dust bowl,
and programs to address the cataclysmic effects
of massive land erosion. More recently, the
Plains have given support to Richard Nixon and
Ronald Reagan, doing so in the apparent belief
that private enterprise and individual effort alone
would solve national problems.
Taken together, these developments warn us
about the elusive nature of our quest for the
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legal culture of the Great Plains. It may exist,
but more as a paradox than as a bundle of values
and attitudes associated with a clear geographical area. Scholars disagree about whether there
is--or was-a Great Plains and whether the
widely accepted environmental definition of region gains coherence at the expense of distorting the East-West cultural similarities that sing
through the Plains.
As is true with all regional approaches to
legal culture, we must be careful not to confuse
the description of an area with the motive forces
that bring about legal change in the first place.
Even if we find, in the end, a strong correlation
among geography, climate, and law, we may
not be much further along in understanding the
region's legal culture, because to grasp the values and attitudes that shape law on the Great
Plains or elsewhere we must necessarily look at
those issues of law and society where they are
most likely to appear-in the ways in which law
mediates among competing modes of production and in the role it has played in defining
and sustaining gender, class, and race relations.
My suspicion is that when we approach the issue
of legal culture in this way we are likely to find
that the Great Plains was far more like the rest
of American legal culture than it was different
from it. Differences between the Plains and other
regions tended to be those of timing, pace, and
manner, not differences in fundamental social
attitudes.
There is, of course, no such thing as the legal
culture of the Great Plains, or of the South or
the West for that matter. In an area as diverse
as the Plains, there are all sorts of attitudes and
opinions about law, and we should be prepared
to understand them. But on a broad scale the
standard shibboleths about individualism, innovation, democracy, and lawlessness seem
overwrought. We may be skillfull and, yes, lucky,
enough to be able to divine certain broad tendencies, ones that would help, if identified, to
shape our understanding of not just the lawthe statutes, the judicial pronouncements, the
organizational schemes-but of the connection
between it and social change. If we understand
such connections, then we will certainly have

a much better idea about whether what goes on
through the legal process in this region can actually be analyzed as a coherent legal culture.
These are of necessity only surface impressions about the legal culture of the Great Plains.
Perhaps there is more that is distinctive to it
than seems to be the case. There may well be
some yawning gulf that separates attitudes and
values about the law in, say, South Dakota,
from those in California or New Jersey. To find
out we simply must learn more about law on
the Great Plains.
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